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Lets Defend - SOC Event ID 238

Lets Defend - SOC Event ID 238

SOC153 -Suspicious Powershell Script Executed -Malware


Security Incident Report – Suspicious PowerShell Execution (SOC153)

Screenshot 2026-04-13 at 2.09.05 PM.png

1. Executive Summary

On March 14, 2024, at 05:23 PM, a security alert (SOC153 – Suspicious PowerShell Script Executed) was triggered on host Tony. The alert indicates execution of a potentially malicious PowerShell script (payload_1.ps1) from a user download directory.

Analysis confirms that the script is malicious, associated with external command-and-control (C2) communication, and was not quarantined by endpoint protection. Immediate remediation actions are required to prevent further compromise.


2. Incident Details

FieldValue
Event ID238
Alert RuleSOC153 – Suspicious PowerShell Script Executed
Severity LevelMedium (Security Analyst Review Required)
HostnameTony
IP Address172.16.17.206
Event TimeMar 14, 2024 – 05:23 PM
File Namepayload_1.ps1
File PathC:\Users\LetsDefend\Downloads\payload_1.ps1
File Hash (SHA-256)db8be06ba6d2d3595dd0c86654a48cfc4c0c5408fdd3f4e1eaf342ac7a2479d0
EDR StatusDetected (Not Quarantined)

3. Threat Indicators (IOCs)

File Indicators

Screenshot 2026-04-13 at 2.38.36 PM.png

  • File Name: payload_1.ps1
  • SHA-256 Hash: db8be06ba6d2d3595dd0c86654a48cfc4c0c5408fdd3f4e1eaf342ac7a2479d0

Network Indicators

  • Malicious URL:

    1
    
      http://91.236.116.163/INDEX.PHP?ID=90059C37-1320-41A4-B58D-2B75A9850D2F&SUBID=9G6CLLE6
    
  • Command & Control (C2) IPs:

    • 3.5.130.147
    • 161.22.46.148:443 (kionagranada.com)

4. Analysis Summary

4.1 Behavioral Analysis

  • The PowerShell script was executed from a user download directory, a common attacker technique.
  • PowerShell is frequently abused for:
    • Downloading secondary payloads
    • Establishing persistence
    • Communicating with remote C2 servers

4.2 Malware Analysis Findings

Using third-party tools such as:

  • VirusTotal

    Screenshot 2026-04-13 at 2.35.34 PM.png

  • Hybrid Analysis
  • Any.Run

The file was flagged as malicious/suspicious, confirming:

  • External communication attempts
  • Indicators of downloader/backdoor behavior
  • Possible data exfiltration or remote command execution capability

    Screenshot 2026-04-13 at 3.07.18 PM.png

4.3 Network Activity

  • The script attempted communication with known malicious infrastructure.
  • HTTPS traffic over port 443 suggests encrypted C2 communication, making detection harder.

5. Impact Assessment

CategoryAssessment
System CompromiseLikely
Data ExposurePossible
Persistence MechanismUnknown (needs further investigation)
Lateral Movement RiskMedium
Detection EvasionPossible (PowerShell abuse + encryption)

6. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Screenshot 2026-04-13 at 3.07.36 PM.png

TechniqueDescription
T1059.001PowerShell Execution
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1071.001Web Protocol (HTTP/HTTPS C2 Communication)
T1027Obfuscated/Encrypted Payloads

7. Root Cause Analysis

The infection likely originated from:

  • User downloading a malicious script from an untrusted source
  • Lack of PowerShell execution restrictions
  • Endpoint protection detecting but not blocking the threat

8. Response Actions Taken

  • Alert reviewed and validated as true positive
  • Malware identified via hash and behavioral analysis
  • Indicators extracted for further containment

Immediate Actions

  • Isolate the affected host (Tony) from the network
  • Manually remove the malicious file:

    1
    
      C:\Users\LetsDefend\Downloads\payload_1.ps1
    
  • Block all identified IOCs:
    • IP addresses
    • Domain (kionagranada.com)
    • Malicious URL

Short-Term Actions

  • Perform full antivirus/EDR scan
  • Check for persistence mechanisms:
    • Scheduled tasks
    • Registry run keys
  • Review PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)

Long-Term Actions

  • Enforce PowerShell execution policies (e.g., Restricted/AllSigned)
  • Enable advanced logging:
    • Script Block Logging
    • Module Logging
  • Conduct user awareness training
  • Deploy network-level threat blocking (IDS/IPS)

10. Conclusion

The alert represents a confirmed malicious PowerShell execution attempt involving external command-and-control communication. The lack of automatic quarantine increases the risk of compromise.

Prompt containment and remediation are critical to prevent:

  • Further system compromise
  • Potential lateral movement
  • Data exfiltration
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